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Framing "Deception" and "Covertness" in Research: 
Do Milgram, Humphreys, and Zimbardo Justify 
Regulating Social Science Research Ethics?
 Dvora Yanow & Peregrine Schwartz-Shea
Abstract: No systematic assessment exists that justifies the extension of ethics regulations to non-
experimental social science research. Instead, three studies—by MILGRAM, HUMPHREYS, and 
ZIMBARDO—are repeatedly cited to support such regulation, based on their use of deception 
and/or covertness. Challenging such regulation requires these studies' detailed re-examination. In 
this article we offer a critique of deception and covert research as understood solely within the 
context of experimentation: that framing of those research activities has narrowed their 
consideration in ways that do a disservice to social science research (as comparison with studies 
by ROSENHAN and LEO further clarifies). We show that, controversial as they may have been, 
these projects met a key ethics principle: "beneficence," something ignored by most of the critics 
assessing their work. Theorizing deception and covertness, we establish distinctions between them 
and argue for the importance of their use in studies of powerful individuals and organizations, as 
current political climates make evident.
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"By participant observation we mean that method in which the observer participates 
in the daily life of the people under study, either openly in the role of researcher or 
covertly in some disguised role ..." (BECKER & GEER, 1957, p.28).
1. Stage-Setting
Three studies are commonly used to justify regulating social science research 
ethics—MILGRAM, HUMPHREYS, and ZIMBARDO—in part because of their use 
of deception and/or covertness. Understandings of those three studies, however, 
are overly simplistic. Consequently, fieldwork studies of powerful institutions and 
actors in which deception/covertness would be reasonable are misregulated. [1]
After reviewing the background concerning ethics regulations and 
deception/covertness, we examine those three studies' research designs, plus 
two others, for their uses of deception and/or covertness as these bear on human 
subjects/participants, contrasting experiments and field research. Our analysis 
shows that deception and covertness are distinct, the former having several 
facets and changing by method. Today's political climate demands a re-thinking 
of what is appropriate in regulating politically fraught research, as social scientists 
may increasingly find themselves conducting research that challenges 
governments and powerful individuals and organizations, turning to deceptive 
and/or covert practices to do so. [2]
1.1 Policy history
"[I]t is high time ... for society to take its own measures of self-protection against 
those zealots of science who have ceased to distinguish between their brothers and 
guinea pigs ..." (Russian physician Dr. Vikenty VERESSAYEV, quoted in B. GRAY, 
1975, p.9).
US policy regulating research ethics is rooted in a history of unethical medical 
experimentation: not only the Tuskegee syphilis study and Nazi doctors' 
concentration camp abuses, but also over 4000 government-sponsored radiation 
experiments, including on prisoners and retarded children and adults in hospitals 
(ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, 1995). In 
1974, Congress passed the National Research Act (PL 93-348) regulating 
"biomedical and behavioral research" with human "subjects." Regulation was to 
be achieved through prior review of research proposals, by "institutional review 
boards" (IRBs). Other states in the "Anglosphere"—Canada, the UK, and 
Australia—followed suit. [3]
Three ethical principles recur across these policies: respect for persons, 
beneficence, and justice. They derive from key statements adopted in the 
aftermath of World War II: the 1947 Nuremberg Code, the 1948 Declaration of 
Geneva, and the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. Although many assume there were 
no ethical codes prior to this time, this section's epigraph dates to a Russian 
researcher writing in 1916; B. GRAY (1975, p.9) also quotes one from a 1767 
legal case. Moreover, in 1931 Germany adopted "Regulations on New Therapy 
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and Human Experimentation" requiring medical researchers to obtain subjects' 
informed consent before beginning experimentation (WEINDLING, 2001, p.41). 
The Nazi doctors' "medical experimentation" violated that law, their acts making 
"it apparent that the 'experimental' use of human beings could be monstrously 
perverted" (B. GRAY, 1975, p.5).1 [4]
The "Anglosphere" states' research regulation, excepting Canada's, initially 
engaged medical experimentation; social sciences were an afterthought. The US 
became more stringent about including them two decades after the 1974 Act, with 
the 1991 "Common Rule" unifying regulatory policy across federal agencies 
(OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, n.d.). But IRB regulations 
were extended to non-experimental social science without seriously considering 
social scientists' input concerning how their methods and ethical concerns differ 
from those of medical and other experimental researchers (SCHRAG, 2010). [5]
Manuals for training review board members and staff (e.g., AMDUR & BANKERT, 
2011; BAILEY, 2014), methods textbooks (e.g., NEUMAN, 1997, p.477), and 
non-US policy statements typically invoke three studies as evidence of social 
scientists' unethical conduct requiring their regulation: Stanley MILGRAM's 
obedience (or shock) experiments; Laud HUMPHREYS' field-research study of 
homosexuals; and Philip ZIMBARDO's "Stanford prison experiment." The projects 
are presented as if they were self-evidently unethical, based on presumed harms 
to subjects/participants: "Certain studies are assumed to be so well known that 
you just have to mention their name, and a whole host of associations are 
supposedly established in the head of your reader" (CAVE & HOLM, 2003, p.27). 
That the research was done without full disclosure, through the use of deception 
or covertness, is central to such assessments. [6]
A policy-analytic framing approach (VAN HULST & YANOW, 2016) suggests that 
some other, tacitly known yet unmentioned, extra-research meanings are in play. 
These are projected onto the three studies, framing perceptions of their ethical 
breaches. The facticity of their ethicality generates a policy myth (YANOW, 2016) 
blocking further inquiry, silencing challenges to social science research 
regulation. [7]
A critical assessment of such regulation, then, requires revisiting the MILGRAM-
HUMPHREYS-ZIMBARDO troika and their uses of deception and covertness. We 
join others who have also sought to "rehabilitate" those three studies (e.g., 
SIEBER & TOLICH, 2013). Adding two other equally significant projects—David 
ROSENHAN's pseudo-patient study (1973) and Richard LEO's (1996a, 2008) 
police investigator field research—enables sharper distinctions between those 
two concepts. Rather than start with a priori definitions of deception and 
covertness, we undertake a textual ethnography (JACKSON, 2006) of these 
cases' research reports and critiques, treating them as evidentiary sources for 
different research practices and "reading" them to see what deception/covertness 
actually entail. Our analysis reveals a complexity that most commentaries ignore. 
1 Additionally, physical anthropologists in the Third Reich checked their methodological concerns 
with US colleagues (SCHAFFT, 2004).
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Controversial as they may have been, these projects met a central ethical 
principle—beneficence. Additionally, treating HUMPHREYS' field research 
alongside MILGRAM's and ZIMBARDO's experiments implies an unwarranted 
equivalence across research designs and ethics perspectives, making field 
research similarly require prior review. The two added cases, from psychology 
and criminology, further illuminate the context-specificity of deception and 
covertness and their desirability in politically charged research.2 [8]
A terminological-cum-ethical note before proceeding. Although "biomedical" has 
become common usage in ethics regulation talk, it emerged out of a strategy to 
position medicine "as a scientific discipline" (BENNINGHOFF, 2015, p.7). Much of 
the unethical experimentation out of which regulations grew was conducted by 
physicians simultaneously treating patients and experimenting on them, thereby 
blurring those two roles: "[T]here was little differentiation made between research 
and therapy, between the physician and investigator, and between the patient 
and subject" (PECKMAN, 2001, n.p.). Such role confusion does not characterize 
the social sciences, where researchers do not have therapeutic relationships with 
those they study. Therein lies part of the challenge in assessing deception and 
covertness for non-experimental social science. [9]
1.2 What's wrong with deception and covertness? Initial understandings
The three post-WWII ethics principles were translated into operationalizable 
research practices in the Belmont Report (NATIONAL COMMISSION, 1978), the 
basis for US regulations (see Table 1).
Nuremberg (1947), Geneva (1948), 
Helsinki (1964)
Belmont Report (1978)
Respect for persons Securing informed consent
Beneficence Assessing potential research risks in light 
of expected societal benefits
Justice Selecting subjects equitably 
Table 1: Translating ethics principles into research practices [10]
The developing policy attended, in particular, to vulnerable research subjects; 
privacy and the confidentiality of subjects' data were added beginning in the 
1990s; some states have added principles beyond those three. [11]
In the logic of Belmont's framework, informed consent renders research 
participation voluntary, thereby enacting respect for persons. VAN DEN 
HOONAARD (2014, p.181) argues that informed consent has become "the 
perceived lynchpin in the ethical conduct of all research." Using deception—
depriving subjects of complete and accurate information concerning what will 
2 For want of space, we do not delve into online field-research or political science or economics 
field experiments, although these sometimes involve covertness or deception (DESPOSATO, 2016).
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happen to them during a study—decreases their ability to appraise potential risks. 
Covert research keeps subjects from knowing that they are being studied, 
rendering voluntariness moot. Deception and covertness would seem, then, 
prima facie unacceptable, and some field researchers assume that ethics review 
committees prohibit them. That is not the case. The Belmont Report (NATIONAL 
COMMISSION, 1978, p.30), for instance, says that "incomplete disclosure" is 
justified
• when it is "truly necessary" to the research purpose, not simply a matter of 
investigator convenience;
• when there are no "undisclosed risks that are more than minimal"; and
• when the project also includes some sort of debriefing, "when appropriate," or 
a later sharing of the research results. [12]
First used in print by MILGRAM, "debriefing" encapsulates what had been three 
distinct activities: "dehoaxing" (revealing the deception), "catharsis" (stress 
alleviation), and "assessment of subjects' perceptions" (whether they had responded 
to treatment variables or to their understandings of experimenters' expectations). 
By 1968, debriefing had become the accepted post-experimental activity to 
compensate for deception in psychology (HARRIS, 1988, pp.195, 202). [13]
Although the Belmont Report leaves considerable room for deception where risk 
to subjects is minimal, its insistence on immediate debriefing or later sharing 
suggests that Report authors understood "incomplete disclosure" in the context of 
experimentation, not field research. As we will demonstrate, treating covertness 
and deception interchangeably and the latter as if its meaning were singular 
obscures key differences, including disciplinary- and methods-specificities. This 
occlusion results from the particular research designs, settings, and idea of 
vulnerability ensconced in Belmont Report principles, generalized, 
inappropriately, as universal ethical standards. [14]
Such conceptualizations of deception and covertness serve as starting points for 
analyzing the five studies. Treating them as empirical data enables us to examine 
the adequacy of these initial understandings. [15]
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2. The Troika: MILGRAM, ZIMBARDO, and HUMPHREYS
We sequence these three studies in modified chronological order—MILGRAM 
started in 1960-1961, ZIMBARDO in 1971, and HUMPHREYS in 1966—taking 
ZIMBARDO second to highlight the significant differences between the two 
experimental research designs and the field research. MILGRAM's were classic 
laboratory experiments: research subjects came to a university-based lab for 
"administration" of the "treatment," in two dozen variations. ZIMBARDO's 
laboratory research, also university-based, was a role-playing simulation. 
HUMPHREYS', by contrast, was a classic two-phase sociological field research 
study, the researcher going on location for participant-observation followed, a 
year later, by further observation and a survey. That all were carried out in the 
same decade makes comparative analysis of the ethical issues at the time of the 
research more feasible. [16]
2.1 MILGRAM
Stanley MILGRAM's obedience experiments are well known, perhaps because 
they have been widely taught in undergraduate psychology courses and have 
inspired plays, films, television shows, novels, and songs (PERRY, 2012, p.7). As 
MILLER (2013, p.22) notes, the research remains "of unprecedented and 
continuing interest and impact." [17]
In 1960, MILGRAM started planning a series of experiments to test obedience to 
authority. Subjects, recruited through advertisements offering $4 for the hour 
(equal to $33.09 in 20183), plus $0.50 for transportation, were told the experiment 
tested using punishments to induce learning. Under the direction of a man 
wearing a lab coat ("the experimenter"), they administered what they believed 
were real electric shocks to a person ("the learner") trained to respond as if he 
were being shocked. In 11 of 23 experiments, MILGRAM found that 50% or more 
of the subjects administered the highest degree of "electric shock," even after 
"the learner" began to scream or bang on the wall. Subjects obeyed the 
instructions of the lab-coated authority figure to a greater degree than what 
MILGRAM and others had anticipated (PERRY, 2012, pp.304-310). [18]
First published in a 1963 article (the book appeared in 1974), MILGRAM's 
research, initially funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF), relied on 
deceiving his subjects—getting them to believe things that were not the case 
(e.g., that the shocks were real) and not informing them as to the true purpose of 
the research. Part of the deception entailed using confederates (e.g., the 
"experimenter"). Subjects knew they were participating in research; that is, the 
research was not done covertly. When he was present, MILGRAM watched from 
behind a one-way mirror, emerging at the end to interact with subjects. [19]
The American Association for the Advancement of Science awarded MILGRAM a 
research prize in 1964, but his work was challenged on ethical grounds because 
3 http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm   [Accessed: February 12, 2018]. For context, 
one subject's day job paid $2.50/hour (PERRY 2012, p.178).
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of the deception. BAUMRIND (1964, p.422) argued, as others did later, that the 
research was unethical because its deception subjected participants to undue 
psychological stress, claiming also that "his casual assurance that [stress was] 
dissipated before the subjects left the laboratory is unconvincing." Some of the 
controversy around the ethical entailments of the experiments seemingly issued 
also from his having the lab-coated "experimenter" insist that research subjects 
continue to administer the shocks, rather than terminating the encounter at their 
first-expressed hesitations. [20]
Here lie three central concerns regarding the ethics of deception in psychological 
experimentation, where it was commonly used at the time:
1. Did the experiment expose participants to undue psychological stress, which 
the deception rendered them unable to avoid (i.e., no informed consent)? 
2. Were subjects properly debriefed (arguably alleviating that stress)? 
3. Could the same research goals have been achieved without deception? [21]
Although refined since then, these questions form the backbone for assessments 
of deceptive research in psychology to this day (see AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 2017, Sections 8.05, 8.07, and 8.08). We will 
apply them to all five cases, even the field research ones. [22]
Clearly, MILGRAM's subjects were subjected to stress. On the matter of the 
second question, MILGRAM (1963, p.374), presenting the first experiment, briefly 
described dehoaxing: 
"[P]rocedures were undertaken to assure that the subject would leave the laboratory 
in a state of well being. A friendly reconciliation was arranged between the subject 
and the victim, and an effort was made to reduce any tensions that arose as a result 
of the experiment." [23]
He expanded on this in his reply to BAUMRIND:
"A careful post-experimental treatment was administered to all subjects. ... [A]ll ... 
were told that the victim had not received dangerous electric shocks. ... The 
experiment was explained to the defiant subjects in a way that supported their 
decision to disobey the experimenter. Obedient subjects were assured of the fact that 
their behavior was entirely normal and that their feelings of conflict or tension were 
shared by other participants. Subjects were told that they would receive a 
comprehensive report at the conclusion of the experimental series. In some 
instances, additional detailed and lengthy discussions of the experiments were also 
carried out with individual subjects. ... All subjects received a follow-up questionnaire 
regarding their participation in the research, which again allowed expression of 
thoughts and feelings about their behavior" (MILGRAM, 1964, p.849). [24]
Assessing his 1963 interviews with 32 of MILGRAM's subjects, psychiatrist Paul 
ERRERA (1972, p.400) concluded, "none were found ... to show signs of having 
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been harmed by their experience. The largest number claimed to have enjoyed 
participating in the project." SOBLE (1978, p.43) reported finding no long-term 
psychological harm to over 98% of the subjects.4 [25]
On the third question, even critics such as KELMAN (1967) do not question the 
need for some deception for hypotheses such as MILGRAM's. Replicating 
MILGRAM's fifth experiment, BURGER (2009) still had to use deception. SIEBER 
and TOLICH (2013, pp.53-54) praise MILGRAM's ethical procedures (debriefing, 
the follow-up survey), given the state of ethical discussion at that time; they never 
challenge the necessity of deception. [26]
Between 1930 and the 1970s, the number of published social psychology articles 
reporting the use of deception increased from under 10% to 50% (PERRY, 2012, 
p.317, n.33). Reviewing the pre-1964 research, HARRIS (1988, pp.193-194) 
notes that most did not reveal their deceptions. MILGRAM, that is, apparently 
conformed to contemporaneous disciplinary practices, including existing APA 
ethics guidelines (PERLSTADT, 2013, pp.73, 59). Moreover, his debriefing 
processes were scrutinized by an NSF committee in a site visit, the "equivalent of 
a human subjects review" (p.56). Why he has been singled out for critical 
attention is, then, puzzling—except for the explosiveness of his findings and their 
tie to Holocaust discussions.5 [27]
Analyses of newly accessible archival materials, however, challenge his reported 
procedures with respect to debriefing (e.g., NICHOLSON, 2015). The contrast 
between MILGRAM's research narratives and archival evidence suggests that his 
"published accounts represent a partial and in some cases idealized version of 
what transpired" (BRANNIGAN, NICHOLSON & CHERRY, 2015, p.553). 
MILGRAM, though, expressed his doubts privately, in his notes: 
"Several of these experiments, it seems to me, are just about on the borderline of 
what ethically can and cannot be done with human subjects. Some critics may feel 
that at times they go beyond acceptable limits. These are matters that only the 
community can decide on, and if the ballot were held I am not altogether certain 
which way I would cast my vote" (quoted in PERRY, 2012, p.110). [28]
MILGRAM's research illustrates two facets of deception: deceiving about both 
research purpose and research procedures. The ethics remain polarizing; as 
more archival materials are released, debate is likely to continue. What is clear is 
that the work and critical responses have shaped both scholarly and regulatory 
conceptualizations of deception, thereby constraining understandings of its 
ethical entailments, instrumental value, and relationship to covert research. What 
is not clear is why this social-psychological experiment provides reasonable 
justification for regulating social science field research. [29]
4 PERRY (2012) disputes this; ELMS (2014) notes that her example selection is happenstantial.
5 MILGRAM sought to explain the compliant behavior of ordinary Germans and others during the 
Second World War; see, e.g., ELMS (2009). For one critical view of the relationship of his 
research design and findings to the behavior of ordinary people, see MASTROIANNI (2015).
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2.2 ZIMBARDO
Psychologist Philip G. ZIMBARDO's "Stanford prison experiment," a simulation 
funded by the Office of Naval Research and approved by the Stanford Human 
Subjects Research Review Committee, began in the summer of 1971. First 
reported academically in a 1973 article (HANEY, BANKS & ZIMBARDO, 1973; 
the book appeared in 2007), ZIMBARDO designed a mock prison for a study of 
labeling. Potential subjects were recruited through advertisements offering 
$15/day ($92.91 in 2018 dollars)6, administered personality inventories, and 
interviewed by ZIMBARDO's graduate assistants, who selected an "'abnormally 
normal' group" for random assignment to the roles of guard and prisoner 
(ZIMBARDO, MASLACH & HANEY, 2000, p.224). ZIMBARDO himself adopted 
the role of prison superintendent; an undergraduate assistant played prison 
warden. The graduate assistants who had interviewed potential participants took 
on the roles of psychological counselors, "designed to keep [them] in close 
proximity to the inner workings of the prison" so they could collect data during the 
simulation (ZIMBARDO et al., 2000, p.225). Like MILGRAM, ZIMBARDO did not 
hide his researcher identity from subjects. Unlike MILGRAM, he did not foster 
deception through the use of confederates: subjects knew student assistants' true 
identities. [30]
By the end of the second day of the experiment, "guards" had begun to be 
abusive toward "prisoners." ZIMBARDO related that a colleague from another 
university visiting him on the fifth day called the abuse to his attention (DREIFUS, 
2007). She observed how a "really nice guy" was "transformed in minutes" into a 
"really mean prison guard" (ZIMBARDO et al., 2000, p.216). Her intervention led 
ZIMBARDO to stop the experiment the next morning. [31]
Regarding the first question posed to MILGRAM's experiments, the matter of 
deception-induced stress is clear. HANEY et al. (1973) described its character: 
"prisoners" were subjected to unexpected, mock arrests at home, in full view of 
neighbors; in the prison, they were stripped, sprayed with a "delousing" 
preparation while standing naked, and later made to use the toilet under 
supervision, paper bags over their heads. Five prisoners were released early 
"because of extreme emotional depression, crying, rage, and acute anxiety" 
(p.10). ZIMBARDO later admitted that there was suffering, pain, and humiliation: 
"[W]e did not end the study soon enough. We should have terminated it as soon 
as the first prisoner suffered a severe stress disorder on Day 2" (ZIMBARDO et 
al., 2000, p.211). [32]
The archival evidence is not fully clear as to whether those recruited had 
sufficient prior information concerning research procedures on which to make an 
informed decision about their participation. For instance, in his human subjects 
review application, ZIMBARDO (1971a, p.2) indicated that deception would not be 
used "at any point." The recruitment information sheet (ZIMBARDO, 1971b) 
allows for exiting the experiment—underscoring its voluntariness—while at the 
6 http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm   [Accessed: February 11, 2018].
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same time indicating that subjects would be expected "to participate for the full 
duration of the study. It is obviously essential that no prisoner can leave once 
jailed, except through established procedures" (p.1), seemingly referring to what 
the consent form stipulates. That document begins:
"I ... hereby consent to participate as a volunteer in a prison life study research 
project to be conducted by the Stanford University Psychology Department. The 
nature of the research has been fully explained to me, including ... the fact that paid 
volunteers will be randomly assigned to the roles of either 'prisoners' or 'guards' for 
the duration of the study. I understand that participation in the research project will 
involve a loss of privacy ..." (ZIMBARDO, 1971c, n.p.; emphases added). [33]
But did participants fully understand what "a prison life study" and "loss of 
privacy" would entail? [34]
Most critics of ZIMBARDO's study do not question his claim that no deception 
was involved (e.g., SIEBER & TOLICH, 2013; KELMAN, 1982, p.96, concluded 
that there was no "deliberate" deception), but comparing the consent form with 
the human subjects review board application raises doubt. The latter's 
"Procedures" section, preceding the deception question, states: subjects "will 
however be led to believe that they cannot leave, except for emergency reasons"; 
the "Effects" section says, "[p]rison subjects will be discouraged from quitting" 
(ZIMBARDO, 1971a, pp.1,2, emphases added). Key aspects of these statements 
are not in the consent form, whose emphasis on the initial decision to participate 
seems an attempt to deter withdrawal. Only later did ZIMBARDO admit that he 
had not disclosed "the nature of the arrests and formal booking at police 
headquarters" in advance, misleading parents by putting "on a 'show'" to forestall 
them taking "their sons home if they fully realized the abusive nature of this mock 
prison" (2007, p.234). [35]
Did debriefing alleviate the stress, the second question? ZIMBARDO brought 
subjects together at the conclusion of the study for what he called "encounter 
sessions." He also conducted follow-up interviews. The guards, he noted, 
"suffered from the realization of what they had done under the cloak of their role," 
more so than MILGRAM's subjects because of their "awareness that their 
'shocks' to the prisoners were all real, direct, and continual" (ZIMBARDO, 2007, 
p.234). But detrimental effects were not lasting, he asserted, because subjects 
were psychologically healthy, the experience was unique and confined to the lab 
setting, and the encounter-debriefing took them "off the hook" for any bad 
behavior (p.238). SIEBER and TOLICH (2013, pp.60, 66), however, doubt the 
effectiveness of the debriefing, commenting specifically that prisoners became 
"depressed and extremely stressed" and "the guards were psychologically 
brutalized, burdened to carry scars for life." [36]
Assessing the third question—whether a non-deceptive design could have 
achieved the same research ends—is less straightforward than in MILGRAM's 
research, due both to the study's premature termination and its somewhat 
ambiguous purpose. Both human subjects review board application and 
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recruitment sheet name the purpose as norm development related to labeling; the 
consent form says subjects are volunteering for a "prison life study." Could a 
labeling experiment—such as the classic Pygmalion effect (ROSENTHAL & 
JACOBSON, 1968)7—be conducted without deception? [37]
ZIMBARDO's subjects, like MILGRAM's, knew they were participating in 
research; the research was not covert. Unlike MILGRAM, however, ZIMBARDO 
presented himself to his subjects in two roles: researcher and participant; and he 
submerged his researcher identity within his prison superintendent role. Striving 
to emulate prison systems "under investigation by [governmental] oversight 
committees" (2007, p.234), ZIMBARDO identified so strongly with his situational 
role that he may even have shaped "guards'" behavior through their initial briefing 
(P. GRAY, 2013). The mixing of roles adds another dimension to be assessed in 
terms of its ethical consequences, as we will see below. [38]
Once again, an experiment becomes questionable reason for regulating field 
research. Control over research settings, procedures, and participants is a key 
characteristic of experiments; deception arises in the first two. Such control does 
not obtain in field research: the character of deception changes as research 
methods change. [39]
2.3 HUMPHREYS
Laud HUMPHREYS' sociology dissertation research, completed in 1968 
(published as a book in 1970), entailed two years' participant-observer 
ethnography featuring unobtrusive measures, with a second, six-month phase of 
follow-up survey research and observing. HUMPHREYS "pass[ed] as deviant" 
(HUMPHREYS, 1975 [1970], p.24), offering to stand guard, in the situational role 
of "watchqueen" (lookout), in several park restrooms ("tearooms") known as 
settings for homosexual encounters. As such sex was then illegal, he would alert 
those present if a police car appeared. Afterwards, he noted the men's and their 
cars' descriptions and automobile license plate numbers. This phase of the 
research was largely covert. Those he observed knew him in his role as 
watchqueen, not as researcher, with one set of exceptions: engaging a dozen 
men in conversation, he revealed his researcher role, later generating hundreds 
of hours of interviews. [40]
Subsequently, posing as a market researcher, he obtained access from "friendly" 
police to automobile license registers. Using telephone directories and other 
"archival" materials, he matched names and addresses to license plate numbers 
(p.38). A year after his tearoom-based research, disguising his appearance, he 
visited those men at home as part of a social health survey he was hired to 
7 Teachers were told that certain students were expected to bloom that year, by contrast with 
others. Testing at the end of the year demonstrated greater achievement by that first group of 
students. ROSENTHAL and JACOBSON attributed the differences in test scores to the different 
labeling of the two student groups, which led each teacher to communicate, nonverbally, 
different expectations for performance to members of each group, and each group's members 
responded in keeping with the high or low expectations communicated to them.
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conduct (p.41). This part of the research was deceptive: neither police nor survey 
respondents knew his full research purpose. [41]
HUMPHREYS' research proposal had been reviewed and approved by his Ph.D. 
committee. That approval included his collecting automobile registrations, done 
for sampling purposes at the suggestion of his dissertation supervisor Lee 
RAINWATER (HUMPHREYS, 1975 [1970], p.30). But other department 
members, learning about the research after its completion, argued that it violated 
research ethics, invading subjects' privacy and potentially threatening their social 
standing, jobs, marriages, etc. Several petitioned the university president to 
rescind his degree; in the ensuing year, some half of the department's members 
left for other universities (SIEBER, n.d.). Nevertheless, the book received the 
Society for the Study of Social Problems' C. Wright Mills award. [42]
The same three evaluative questions may be asked of HUMPHREYS' research. 
Assessing the first question, concerning undue psychological stress, requires 
evaluating the two phases of his project separately. For the covert observational 
phase, psychological stress would seem absent, as the men would not have felt 
surveilled; quite the contrary, they likely felt relieved by HUMPHREYS' presence 
at the watch. Stress-inducing risks would have been produced more by his Phase 
II home visits to men he had identified as homosexual—had they known of his 
research purpose. Being outed (in today's language) would likely have harmed 
their reputations, employment, and family relationships and led to arrest. 
HUMPHREYS was keenly aware of these risks, taking great care to mitigate 
them. Contrary to its presentation in textbooks and training materials, no 
evidence exists that his research harmed any of the participants/subjects, short or 
long term. [43]
Question 2, debriefing, presumes a controlled location—a laboratory—which 
subjects enter for a bounded period. Standard in experimental research, 
debriefing is not applicable to covert field research: it cannot correct for stress 
where subjects do not know they are being studied. Covert fieldwork often means 
(quasi-)public, anonymous observations; researchers would be unable to identify 
individuals observed, rendering debriefing moot. Additionally, debriefing those 
who have been studied covertly (or deceptively) might actually engender stress, 
something clear in HUMPHREYS' case. [44]
As to whether HUMPHREYS could have achieved his research goals without 
covert observation and deception, the third question, SIEBER and TOLICH 
(2013, pp.72-73) conclude that obtaining consent in Phase I would have been 
impossible. They do fault him, however, on Phase II: accessing automobile 
registries and entering the homes of those so located. Because he wanted 
license plate numbers to generate a sampling frame, they contend that 
HUMPHREYS' "only" ethical option was to forgo that aspect of his research 
design and expand his interviewing beyond his dozen informants. Having 
generated the location information, they further suggest that instead of putting the 
men further at risk by himself entering their homes, he should have used a postal 
survey or had others conduct the in-home interviews. [45]
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We question these recommendations, given the contemporaneous anti-
homosexual climate and HUMPHREYS' research goals. First, he described the 
time and personal contact needed to identify just those twelve tearoom visitors for 
extended conversations. Conceding retrospectively that the home visits could 
have endangered respondents vis à vis authorities (1975 [1970], pp.230-31), he 
notes that it would have taken him "another year or so" to cultivate additional 
"willing respondents" like the "intensive dozen." And this would have entailed 
additional risk: "Each time I start to involve another person ... I risk exposing that 
person to stigmatization" (p.225). Second, forgoing Phase II would have altered 
his research design—his goal of unobtrusive, representative research—as well as 
its outcome. A postal survey would have meant losing observations of subjects' 
customary environments; having others make observational visits would have 
required him to expose men's identities to the research assistants, increasing 
potential risk. Without the survey and home observations his book is likely not to 
have had the same destigmatizing impact, as that entails, in part, showing the 
ways in which a group is "normal." [46]
Unlike MILGRAM, who kept his ethical ruminations to himself, HUMPHREYS 
engaged his in print. He opens "A Question of Ethics" with a passage from 
sociologist Kai ERIKSON:
"'So long as we suspect that a method we use has at least some potential for 
harming others, we are in the extremely awkward position of having to weigh the 
scientific and social benefits of that procedure against its possible costs in human 
discomfort'" (HUMPHREYS, 1975 [1970], p.167). [47]
Arguing that ERIKSON's focus on methods implies that some subjects should not 
be studied, HUMPHREYS (1975 [1970], p.210) writes, "[w]e are not, however, 
protecting a harassed population of deviants by refusing to look at them," 
questioning whether any method exists without the potential to harm someone. [48]
The research, then, was both covert and deceptive. Phase I was covert, for most 
subjects, because they did not know they were being studied. But more than that: 
participant-observer field research rests on a researcher's dual roles, as both 
researcher and situational member (GANS, 1976). To conduct field research, the 
researcher must be present; to conduct covert field research, the researcher role 
must be backgrounded, foregrounding the assumed situational role. Covertness 
hinges on disguised identities, not just on disguised research: the former is the 
primary means of ensuring that people are unaware they are being observed, 
enabling access that likely would be impossible otherwise. Using disguised 
identities makes no sense in experimentation, unless researchers are taking on 
the role of confederates; researchers can take on situational roles in simulations, 
but this risks role confusion, as we saw with ZIMBARDO, leading to unethical 
conduct. [49]
Phase II was deceptive, as HUMPHREYS disguised his research purposes and 
procedures, like MILGRAM and ZIMBARDO. Moreover, unobtrusive measures 
ipso facto entail a degree of deception, subjects being unaware that their material 
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worlds are evidentiary sources for inferences. "Procedure," however, means 
something different in field research than in experimentation. In the latter, it is 
"treatment"—MILGRAM's fake machine, ZIMBARDO's failure to reveal the mock 
arrest, etc. This can harm subjects directly. In field research, "procedures" are 
what the researcher does: moving about the setting (e.g., from tearoom to 
automobile), interacting with those present (e.g., as watchqueen or survey 
researcher), even making fieldnotes. Harms are generated by the researcher's 
presence. They have been characterized variously in terms of degradations of 
persons' autonomy, privacy, dignity or reputation. Harms from HUMPHREYS' 
neighborhood observations, conducted without interactions, were negligible. 
Those induced by his in-home survey could have involved all four degradations—
although all depend on discovery by those studied and, especially for reputation, 
by outsiders, such as the police. [50]
In the end, the beneficence of HUMPHREYS' covert and deceptive research is 
not in doubt, having contributed to changes in policies and practices with respect 
to homosexuals (GALLIHER, BREKHUS & KEYS, 2004; NARDI, 1995; SIEBER, 
n.d.). SIEBER (n.d.), for example, notes that "Humphreys' research has helped 
persuade police departments to stop using their resources on arrest for this 
victimless crime." Furthermore, his work made a contribution to research 
methods, as well; as NARDI (1995, p.4) noted, it was described "as an ingenious 
way to uncover difficult-to-study forms of hidden behavior." [51]
3. ROSENHAN and LEO: Refining Understandings of Covertness and 
Deception
MILGRAM's, ZIMBARDO's, and HUMPHREYS' research clarifies distinctions 
between covertness and deception and adds dimensions to what deception 
entails. Covert research disguises the fact of the research itself, as in 
HUMPHREYS/Phase I. In deceptive research, subjects know they are 
participating, but they are deceived about research purpose and/or procedures, 
as in MILGRAM, ZIMBARDO, and HUMPHREYS/Phase II. Expanding our 
comparative analysis by adding two other projects enables us to further sharpen 
our understanding: David ROSENHAN's pseudo-patient field experiment (1973) 
and Richard LEO's police interrogation participant-observer study (1996a, 2008). 
We selected them due to their profound impacts—on beneficence, theory, and/or 
methods—in their respective fields. Their research designs, uses of 
covertness/deception, and power relations all contrast with the troika; also, both 
studied "up" (NADER, 1972) and masked researcher identities, albeit in different 
ways. [52]
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3.1 ROSENHAN
Wondering whether the validity and reliability of mental health diagnoses could be 
tested experimentally, psychology professor David ROSENHAN got himself 
admitted to a mental hospital, complaining of hearing voices (1973). Only the 
hospital administrator and chief psychologist knew his actual identity. 
Hospitalization led to a second dimension of the study: an inside look at staff-
patient relations and the impact of labeling on behavior. The research was 
replicated in eleven other psychiatric hospitals by seven other pseudo-patients. 
All used pseudonyms; the mental health professionals among them disguised 
their occupations. The twelve hospitals were located in five different US states 
and varied by type (e.g., public-private, urban-rural). All pseudo-patients behaved 
"normally." Wanting to be released quickly, they cooperated with staff—other 
than pretending to swallow the medications for treating their "condition." [53]
Subsequently, a research-and-teaching psychiatric hospital's staff heard about 
the experiments and doubted that pseudo-patients could gain access there. 
ROSENHAN agreed to send one or more pseudo-patients to attempt admission 
over the next three months. Of 193 presenting patients during that time, various 
staff suspected 83 of pretending to be ill. In fact, no pseudo-patient appeared, the 
designated individual falling ill the appointed day. [54]
ROSENHAN's study was covert, like HUMPHREYS/Phase I: those being studied 
did not know it. Unlike HUMPHREYS', ROSENHAN's research was conducted in 
private arenas, with formal access. He addressed protecting institutional and 
individual identities: "Obviously, since my concerns are general ones that cut 
across individual hospitals and staffs, I have respected their anonymity and have 
eliminated clues that might lead to their identification" (1973, p.258, n.9). He did 
not directly address the first two of the three key questions, "undue psychological 
stress" on the part of hospital staff or debriefing. But he did engage the third, the 
necessity of covertness, which he termed "concealment." Concerning the 
decision to disguise identities and fake symptoms, he wrote:
"However distasteful such concealment is, it was a necessary first step to examining 
these questions. Without concealment, there would have been no way to know how 
valid these experiences [of psychiatric diagnoses and of hospitalization] were; nor 
[would] there [have been] any way of knowing whether whatever detections [of 
pseudo-patients] occurred were a tribute to the diagnostic acumen of the staff or to 
the hospital's rumor network" (ibid.). [55]
Unlike MILGRAM, although ROSENHAN's subjects—hospital personnel—
interacted with researchers, they did not know the latter's true identities. Unlike 
ZIMBARDO, ROSENHAN and his team were constantly aware of their dual roles, 
taking notes on their observations (which, ironically, personnel-subjects 
integrated into their diagnoses). In terms of beneficence, at least partly in 
response to this research, the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) II—which defined mental illnesses 
for practitioners and insurance companies, treating symptoms as if they were 
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objectively discernible—was revised, removing or redefining several "illnesses" 
(including homosexuality). Unlike HUMPHREYS vis à vis most of his subjects, 
then, ROSENHAN-as-patient was studying "up," observing professionals in 
powerful positions, taking on institutionalized policies and practices. This is the 
crux of determining whether covertness and deception are warranted in politically 
fraught studies. [56]
3.2 LEO
For his criminology Ph.D. dissertation, Richard LEO set out to study a practice 
normally hidden from outside view: police detectives' interrogation of suspects. 
After two years of negotiation, he obtained permission from its chief to conduct a 
participant-observer study in a large, urban police department in "Laconia." 
Introduced as a researcher by the captain to the lieutenants heading the Criminal 
Investigation Division's (CID) five sections and by them to their detectives, LEO 
was still not welcome in the interrogation room: interrogators "feared that I was a 
radical Berkeley graduate student hellbent to discover and expose police 
misconduct" (LEO, 1996b, p.124). LEO described his strategy to overcome this 
distrust as "spend[ing] as much time as possible getting to know them and letting 
them get to know me in my new research role, while seeking to blend into, and 
thus become accepted as a normal part of, their daily work environment" (1995, 
p.119, emphasis added). [57]
Blending in meant that LEO worked "to break down the detectives' academic and 
political stereotypes while reinventing [himself] in a role that was nonthreatening 
to them and thus conducive to acquiring the data [he] was seeking" (ibid., 
emphasis added). He calls this the "'chameleon strategy' of research access: I 
consciously reinvented my persona to fit the attributes, biases, and worldview of 
my subjects." Shaving his beard, cutting his hair, and changing his clothes to 
"mimic" theirs, he "drew on a strategy well known to field researchers ..." (LEO, 
1995, p.120). His purpose was
"to demonstrate an empathetic understanding of the detectives' actions, problems, 
and outlooks. ... I feigned conservative politics ... I fabricated a nonthreatening 
research persona in order to establish rapport with the detectives, acquire their trust, 
and gain observational access into the highly exclusive and secretive setting of 
interrogations. As the detectives' stereotypes of me began to break down, I succeeded 
in acquiring the access and data I was seeking" (p.121; emphases added). [58]
Once that happened, "they appeared to be far less concerned with my political 
values and the potential for exposure. And, correspondingly, I felt less guarded in 
their presence" (LEO, 1996b, p.124). The pretense, however, was apparently not 
without cost to LEO himself, who, like HUMPHREYS but unlike MILGRAM, 
reflected in print on the ethical implications:
"Although all field researchers must assume social roles that fit into the worlds they 
are studying, there are personal and moral costs associated with enacting such role 
pretenses. ... I acted in ways that I would consider morally reprehensible in other 
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contexts. ... I conned the detectives ...; in effect, I intentionally manipulated my 
research subjects. Privately, I felt uncomfortable about my actions" (LEO, 1996b, 
p.124). [59]
LEO's 2008 book won three awards (two from the Society for the Study of Social 
Problems Law and Society Division, one from the Academy of Criminal Justice 
Sciences); his data and the analysis they buttressed produced a stream of 
publications on police interrogation practices and the "false confession" problem 
these interrogations sometimes produce. He was lauded for opening these settings 
up to oversight, cited by US appellate courts and the US Supreme Court. [60]
As LEO's field research was not covert—interrogators knew he was a researcher 
doing research—the first two questions, "undue psychological stress" and proper 
"debriefing," do not apply. The third question, concerning deception's necessity, 
however, is central, but it bears on LEO's presentation-of-self, not on research 
purposes or procedures. His selective self-presentation led to a fierce exchange 
with eminent sociologist Kai ERIKSON (1995, 1996), whose essay on disguised 
observation (ERIKSON, 1967) HUMPHREYS had quoted nearly three decades 
earlier. LEO admitted that his "chameleon strategy" misled people about his 
political worldview, but "to have represented myself differently would surely 
have ... blocked my ability to penetrate the code of secrecy surrounding 
interrogation practices inside Laconia's CID, and thus would have prevented me 
from acquiring the kind of data I was seeking" (1995, p.121). ERIKSON 
countered that under the circumstances, LEO should not have done the research: 
"The price Leo thought he had to pay for the opportunity of observing what went 
on in those interrogation rooms was to lie repeatedly about himself" (ERIKSON, 
1995, p.9; emphasis added). [61]
This exchange adds to ROSENHAN's "concealment" in elaborating a third 
dimension of deception: can self-presentation potentially harm 
subjects/participants? HUMPHREYS/Phase I and ROSENHAN's healthcare 
professionals masked their occupations; LEO masked his values and beliefs. 
Harms from interacting with people who are not what they seem are of a different 
order from those issuing from experiments. ZIMBARDO manifests a variant: less 
a consciously shaped presentation-of-self than a submerging of his self-
awareness as researcher into his prison superintendent persona. In most 
experiments, researchers keep their distance from their subjects, like MILGRAM; 
but ZIMBARDO involved himself to such an extent that he put his research—the 
"integrity of my prison" (ZIMBARDO et al., 2000, p.212)—above the well-being of 
his subjects. Here, the harm is clear, akin to physician-researchers' elevating 
research above therapeutic responsibilities. Regulators saw this as a key reason
—a "conflict of interest" justification—for human protections systems: restraining 
researchers' interests in their findings from overriding subjects/participants' well-
being. But are these the harms of field research deception/covertness? [62]
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4. Learning from the Studies about Covertness/Deception and Harms
 "... the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth ..." (Oath, English law courts, 
13th century on)
What makes distinguishing between covertness and deception difficult is that the 
former entails a form of deception: physically present researchers altering self-
presentation, disguising their researcher role as they take on situational roles. We 
have, then, three different facets of deception bearing on informed consent and a 
study's ethics:
1. Is research purpose fully revealed?
2. Are procedures fully disclosed prior to the study? 
3. What is the researcher's self-presentation? [63]
These are summarized for the five studies in Table 2.
Table 2: Study context, covertness, and deception in five studies. Click here to download 
the PDF file. [64]
To recap: Covertness concerns subjects'/participants' lack of awareness that they 
are being studied, a lack that is enabled by researchers' altered self-presentation
—HUMPHREYS as "watchqueen"; ROSENHAN as patient; neither as 
researcher. Deception concerns participants, knowing they are participating in 
research, not having a full, accurate picture as to what the research entails with 
respect to purpose, procedures, and/or researcher self-presentation. MILGRAM 
and HUMPHREYS/Phase II deceived their subjects on the purpose of the 
research (it was not a learning study, as advertised, or just a social health 
survey). MILGRAM also deceived them on procedures (using confederates), as 
did ZIMBARDO (with surprise "arrests"). Doing covert research, neither 
HUMPHREYS/Phase I nor ROSENHAN deceived on purpose or procedures: 
those deceptions come into play only if subjects/participants know they are 
involved in research. ZIMBARDO and LEO are particular cases of self-
presentation: ZIMBARDO lost track of his researcher responsibilities; LEO 
intentionally adapted his persona, his research demonstrating that disguised self-
presentation need not be used to enable covert research. But as Erving 
GOFFMAN (1959) observed, crafting a situational persona is a common practice in 
everyday life. Choosing what aspects of ourselves we present to others and which 
we try to keep hidden does not mean that we are living unethical lives. Likewise, it 
need not mean that field researchers are necessarily being unethical. [65]
These distinctions are useful for differentiating field research harms from the 
harms of laboratory experimentation, the baseline conceptualization of research 
in the Belmont Report. Two research design features in particular are relevant to 
clarifying and assessing the impact of deception and covertness on 
subjects/participants. [66]
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The first of these is researchers' comparative control over settings and 
subjects/participants. Experimentalists exercise extensive control over both. 
Having already been recruited and selected according to researcher-established 
criteria, subjects just report to researchers' labs. Experimentalists decide, 
unilaterally, what will happen; the ethical impact of their decisions is more 
targeted. With purpose- or procedures-deception, experimentalists' control gives 
them the means—debriefing—to address that harm before subjects depart or 
later on. Field researchers lack such controls: they neither design research 
settings nor invite participants who are native to them into those settings—
because they are already there. HUMPHREYS/Phase I, ROSENHAN, and LEO 
could not dismiss "locals" for not fitting their projects. The control they do 
exercise is over their presentation of self, linked to their ability to move around the 
setting, including enhancing their exposure to various sorts of people, activities, 
events, and so on. [67]
The extent of researcher control is essential to assessing whether and, if so, how 
self-presentation harms participants. To "access" subjects, neither MILGRAM nor 
ZIMBARDO had to self-present as anything other than researcher (even if 
ZIMBARDO chose to do otherwise). "Access" is always in experimentalists' 
hands, as they control the settings; their challenge is attracting subjects. In field 
research, however, access to participants often hinges on self-presentations, as 
HUMPHREYS, ROSENHAN, and LEO illustrate. As it is carried out in natural 
settings, the researcher becomes one more actor in the field, and both 
participants and researchers adjust their presentations-of-self in "natural" 
interpersonal interactions. Field research's harms potentially occur through such 
daily interactions, not through treatment harms. In politically charged settings, the 
use of covertness/researcher-disguise may actually protect those studied: not 
knowing they are being observed gives them plausible deniability if the research 
is discovered; the accountability onus is on the researcher. HUMPHREYS, 
ROSENHAN, and LEO appear to have assumed—correctly, in retrospect—that 
participants would never discover their deceptions either during the research or 
thereafter. Outrage has come from others, such as ERIKSON, reading the 
published studies, experiencing harm vicariously. [68]
The second feature is power manifested in the researcher-researched 
relationship. In experiments, control is power: no matter the subjects' 
backgrounds, the researcher always has power over them; studying up, down or 
laterally is irrelevant. In field research, power is broader than control over a 
laboratory. Researchers' success depends on others situationally more powerful 
than they: participants are already "there"; determining access and whether 
research proceeds is in their hands. HUMPHREYS' tearoom denizens and 
homeowners could have evicted him; once admitted, ROSENHAN and his co-
researchers were subordinate as mental patients to hospital staff; LEO's 
detectives could have ejected him from the interrogation room. [69]
Power differentials are central in studying up: the interests of people in powerful 
positions may lie in preventing research on their institutions and practices, the 
possible sources of their positions and power. In such circumstances, covertness 
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and/or deception appear reasonable design possibilities; without them, research 
would be impossible. HUMPHREYS, for example, was studying down and/or 
"across," given his vulnerable subjects. But his study, like TOMKINSON's (2015), 
took place in the context of state and police power—a scenario not imagined by 
the Belmont Report framework. Covertness/Phase I and deception/Phase II seem 
necessary for undertaking the project at all. [70]
One final observation might be useful, picking up ERIKSON's accusation that 
LEO was lying (quoted above). He is not the only critic to have voiced that notion. 
BAUMRIND (2015) continues to criticize MILGRAM as "lying." WARWICK (1975) 
inveighed against deception altogether, including the Pygmalion study and 
MILGRAM's experiments: this is lying; lying is wrong. He brooks no exceptions: 
context and the societal value of the knowledge gained—that is, beneficence—
are not to be considered, Nuremberg and research ethics policies 
notwithstanding. [71]
Accusing someone of "lying" brings a "Thou shalt not" absolute moralism to the 
discussion. This charge constitutes a seemingly unspoken underpinning of much 
of the criticism of covertness/deception, coloring many of the judgments 
concerning the ethics of their use. Its Anglo legal oath form (in this section's 
epigraph) adds some additional nuance. Parsing the oath makes visible the entire 
discussion's methodological character. Its tenor is rooted in the singularity of 
"truth" assumed to be the object of science, a presupposition grounded in early 
19th century positivist thought and its descendants. By parsing singular truth in 
two aspects, lies of omission (the whole truth) and lies of commission (nothing but 
the truth), the oath suggests a greater complexity concerning lying and truth-
telling which is not captured in judgments such as ERIKSON's. HUMPHREYS, 
ROSENHAN, and LEO depict a range of self-presentation types, from disguised 
researcher identity to "inauthentic" presentation of beliefs and values. Both 
HUMPHREYS and ROSENHAN disguised their researcher identities. But once 
admitted to the hospitals, ROSENHAN and his team could be their everyday 
selves, even to the point of taking research notes, whereas whether 
HUMPHREYS was out of the closet in the tearooms is unknown. LEO was 
decidedly "in the closet" concerning his own beliefs and values, but his research 
identity was fully on display. [72]
Replying to ERIKSON, LEO (1996b, p.123) suggests that a less absolutist, 
universal condemnation of deception and covertness is called for: "[F]ieldwork is 
a morally ambiguous enterprise. The acceptability of deception varies by its type 
and degree, by the context in which it is employed, by the roles and relationships 
we assume, and by the goals and objectives we pursue." Still, however well those 
understandings of lying and truth-telling suit the legal setting and its goals, for 
assessing covertness and deception in research they remain inadequate. Which 
researcher presentation-of-self is authentic—"the whole truth"—and which, a lie? 
Can a participant-observer present a "true" self? For that matter, what about 
subjects' presentations-of-self, whether in focus groups, interviews or field 
settings: are they not also shaping public personae? Even experimentalists 
struggle with the "authentic" character of relationships. Discussing deception in 
FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/
FQS 19(3), Art. 15,  Dvora Yanow & Peregrine Schwartz-Shea: Framing "Deception" and "Covertness" 
in Research: Do Milgram, Humphreys, and Zimbardo Justify Regulating Social Science Research Ethics?
experiments, for instance, SLONE and HULL (2005, p.213, quoting KELMAN) 
admonish researchers to remember "that the experimenter-subject relationship is 
a real relationship 'in which we have responsibility toward the subject as another 
human being whose dignity we must preserve'." But even in "real" relationships 
there is a partial and shaped presentation of self—on both sides. [73]
Delving into these five studies suggests that understanding deception and 
covertness is not only a matter of parsing definitions and moral certitude. 
Certainly, researchers would not want to be caught lying—and who wants to be 
lied to? But the matter is not simple. The danger of approaching 
deception/covertness as lying is that it paints normal, ubiquitous human conduct
—everyday, partial representations-of-self—as morally reprehensible, resorting to 
black-and-white moral logic (FUJII, 2010). But in field research, such black-and-
whiteness is not helpful in bringing clarity to assessments of covertness and 
deception. [74]
Comparing the five cases shows that covertness and deception and concerns 
about them differ from discipline to discipline, method to method, field setting to 
field setting. To take but three disciplines: In experimental psychology, deception 
continues to be accepted, although not always uncontested (BAUMRIND, 2013; 
MILLER, 2013). In sociology, the status of covert research, since the 1930s 
virtually part of the definition of participant observation (BECKER & GEER, 1957; 
see initial epigraph), has changed over the ensuing decades. The AMERICAN 
SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (1999) approved adding conditions for the use 
of covertness/deception only in 1997, explicitly tying it to institutional review board 
approval. The American Political Science Association's ethics guide refers 
members to federal regulations, only. [75]
With respect to methods, treating deception and covertness as synonyms implies 
that they harm uniformly across all research modes. But whereas their uses in 
medical experimentation have clearly led to infractions of the most egregious 
character, documented by PAPPWORTH (1967), among others, it is not clear 
that in other forms of research, they are similarly injurious. Much as different 
disciplines generate their own understandings of what these terms entail, different 
methods do the same, reflecting their own histories and attendant disciplinary 
cultures. Further empirical analysis is needed across a range of social science 
field research projects, by discipline and method, to assess whether and under 
what conditions covertness/deception is used legitimately. [76]
Specifically, what is needed is empirical evidence about the harms field research 
participants have actually experienced. Whereas experimentalists' treatment-
debriefing is closely linked temporally and is, therefore, more easily studied, how 
harms unfold in field research is less known. Harming depends on a chain of 
events:
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1. participants discover covert research or "inauthentic" researcher self-
presentation while it is ongoing;
2. research dissemination reaches participants or others in their sphere;
3. some participants experience harm, through either the first or the second of 
these events. [77]
The harm's character (to autonomy, privacy, dignity or reputation, or as betrayal), 
extent, and longevity presumably varies by participant. The likelihood of 
participants' discovery (the first of these events) is unknown. The likelihood of the 
second taking place is also unknown, although it has probably increased because 
of the internet and as more field researchers study "at home." The likelihood of 
the third is also not clear. Finally, experienced harms could be compared to those 
resulting from other actors—e.g., governments, corporations—which 
surreptitiously monitor citizens' activities. These possibilities and potentialities are 
complex and, to our knowledge, have not been studied systematically, unlike 
harms in psychology. Also missing are "third-party harms," e.g. to MILGRAM's 
confederates, ZIMBARDO's student assistants, LEO's suspects. Having more 
substantive information about harms would improve assessments of a project's 
risk vis à vis its beneficence. [78]
5. Beneficence
"[T]he right to give or withhold consent may be a lesser good than the public right to 
know" (HOMAN, 2006, p.101).
One other, key dimension has been absent from textbooks and training manual 
discussions, although it is ensconced in ethical codes and regulations and 
discussed by defenders of deception (e.g., MARZANO, 2012; SCHEPER-
HUGHES, 2004): the principle of beneficence—"assessing potential research 
risks in light of expected societal benefits," the Belmont Report's 
operationalization, noted in Table 1. HUMPHREYS' response to ERIKSON 
concerning refusing to study deviant populations—that it does not help them—
ties directly to this. One may wish to argue that ends do not justify means; but 
that is precisely how the Common Rule and previous ethics codes framed 
matters. These codes have put a "right to know" beneficence on a collision 
course with a "right to privacy." Parsing risks and benefits in social science 
research and the place of deception/covertness in it must also consider critical 
inquiry into governments, organizations, and other powerful entities, seeking to 
hold powerful institutions and leaders accountable. Yet interpretation of the 
putatively context-free ethics principles has evolved such that "'good research' 
prioritises avoiding risk and harm over achieving benefits" (REDWOOD & 
TODRES, 2006, §1). [79]
What beneficence means in practice is not exactly clear. Nuremberg rejected the 
idea that contributions to scientific knowledge can justify brutal treatment of 
subjects. But at the regulatory level, at least in the US, the complex challenge lies 
in translating the principle into guidance for ethics committees. Per the Belmont 
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Report (NATIONAL COMMISSON, 1978, p.7), "members of the larger society are 
obliged to recognize the longer term benefits and risks that may result from the 
improvement of knowledge." But US federal policy, "Criteria for IRB Approval of 
Research" (45 CFR §46.111[a][2]), appears self-contradictory. Risks to and 
benefits for subjects are to be compared to "the importance of the knowledge that 
may be reasonably expected to result" from a study. In the same paragraph, 
however, IRBs are expressly prohibited from considering "possible long-range 
effects of applying knowledge gained in the research (for example, the possible 
effects of the research on public policy" (CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, 
2009), eliminating one way a research proposal can indicate potential 
beneficence. [80]
Tethering US regulatory policy to an experimental model of deception posits a 
powerful researcher and relatively vulnerable subjects, as discussed above. 
Regulators elsewhere, however, have taken politically charged research on 
board. Canada's 2010 Tri-Council Policy Statements revisions are of central 
significance to politically fraught studies, in whatever discipline, especially in 
today's political climate:
"Research in the form of critical inquiry, that is, the analysis of social structures or 
activities, public policies, or other social phenomena, requires an adjustment in the 
assessment of consent. ... Where social sciences or humanities researchers seek 
knowledge that critiques or challenges the policies and practices of institutions, 
governments, interest groups or corporations, researchers do not need to seek the 
organization's permission to proceed with the proposed research. If institutional 
approval were required, it is unlikely that research could be conducted effectively on 
such matters as institutional sexual abuse or a government's silencing of dissident 
scientists" (CANADIAN INSTITUTES, 2010, pp.35-36). [81]
Important knowledge and insights from research would be foregone.
"[Research Ethics Boards] should also be aware that some research, involving critical 
assessments of public, political or corporate institutions and associated public 
figures, for example, may be legitimately critical and/or opposed to the welfare of  
those individuals in position[s] of power, and may cause them some harm. There  
may be a compelling public interest in this research" (ibid., emphases added). [82]
The policy explicitly recognizes the potential contributions of covert research to 
the public interest for the kinds of dynamics that studies of power engage. [83]
The five studies discussed here were judged in their time to have benefited 
society; their various awards are proxies for this recognition. These are 
summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Beneficence across the five studies. Click here to download the PDF file. [84]
MILGRAM's research had profound impact on societal and theoretical 
understandings of authority relations; even with the archive-based reassessments 
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of his research procedures, his framework and findings continue to have their 
defenders (e.g., MILLER, 2016; REICHER & HASLAM, 2011) and to generate 
thinking about a range of research conduct, including ethics issues (NIEMI 2015, 
pp.10-12). Even ZIMBARDO's truncated project is considered to have enhanced 
understandings of authority relations; over 30 years later, his research was 
deemed significant for the defense in the court-martial of a guard at Abu Ghraib 
prison (DREIFUS, 2007). Contributions to institutionalized policies and practices 
are especially evident in HUMPHREYS', ROSENHAN's, and LEO's projects. 
ROSENHAN's exemplifies the point: without covertness, the researchers could 
not have tested the validity of psychiatric diagnoses or learned about the 
experience of hospitalization. [85]
Textbook and training manual condemnations of the research troika commonly 
omit these three projects' beneficence in favor of their presumed ill-treatment of 
subjects/participants, judging the research according to today's criteria and 
ignoring, for instance, that MILGRAM followed the APA ethics code and 
ZIMBARDO's research was reviewed. Some misrepresent the research record 
outright. The IRB "Member Handbook," for instance, exaggerates, without 
citation, that "[m]any" of MILGRAM's subjects were very upset by "the cruelty of 
their actions"; it asserts, incorrectly, that HUMPHREYS revealed his subjects' 
identities (AMDUR & BANKERT, 2011, pp.13-14). BAILEY's ethics-training's 
representation (2014) of HUMPHREYS—that he endangered subjects—is 
especially injurious due to its widespread use in training US social scientists. 
These misrepresentations constitute evidence consistent with the troika operating 
as a policy myth. [86]
6. The Troika and Social Science Regulation: Concluding Thoughts
"... strategic dishonesty may sometimes be necessary in order for us to act in an 
ethical manner ..." (HAMMERSLEY, 2009, p.214, citing Saville KUSHNER).
Critically assessing ethics review policies enjoins two, related, empirical 
questions. Is there evidence that regulatory policies have prevented 
malfeasance? Is there systematic evidence of ethical breaches in social science 
field research such that its regulation is necessary? We have attended only to the 
second question here, given its direct links to deception/covertness, although as 
JORDAN (2013, p.106) observes, ethics reviewers have taken the lesson from 
MILGRAM's experiments "that researchers ... can be halted from harming 
participants only by submission to the authority of ethics review boards." But 
ZIMBARDO and MILGRAM did pass prior review, which that lesson overlooks. [87]
As to the second question: That medical experimentation deceived in abusive, 
unethical ways is undisputed. In Tuskegee and elsewhere, patient-subjects were 
deceived about their "treatment's" purpose and procedures; physician-
researchers at times elevated their research goals above patient care. An 
experimental research design model in which the researcher is "top dog" enables 
such harms; people are truly in need of protection when experimentalists forget 
that subjects are not "guinea pigs" (per the Russian researcher, Section 1.1 
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epigraph). Informed consent's medical history has so elevated the notion, that 
social scientists who challenge its use are held suspect. Condemnation by moral 
absolutists travels to deception/covertness from attitudes about lying. But in much 
social, political, and organizational field research, researchers are often the less 
powerful persons, at times even themselves needing protection—e.g., from 
military personnel in (post-)conflict research settings (e.g., SRIRAM, KING, 
MERTUS, MARTIN-ORTEGA & HERMAN, 2009). This means not only rethinking 
vulnerability in light of the power dynamics of research relationships, but 
rethinking the circumstances under which it might actually be more ethical to use 
covertness and deception than to forbid them, as HAMMERSLEY (epigraph 
above) suggests. [88]
The three studies we began with cast a long shadow over these discussions. 
MILGRAM's and ZIMBARDO's, in particular, have shaped not only psychologists' 
views, but also—because US policymakers have treated psychology as the social 
science—regulators' approaches to risk, deception/covertness, and researcher 
trustworthiness in all social sciences. Despite its significant design differences, 
HUMPHREYS' research has been joined to that cause. Published just as 
medical-experimental malfeasance began to draw public notice, with research 
ethics regulations beginning to take shape, all three projects attracted widespread 
attention, albeit for different reasons. MILGRAM's and ZIMBARDO's experiments 
stand out for their drama; films of agitated subjects fascinate the general public to 
date. HUMPHREYS' research stands out for its subject matter, the imaginary of 
anonymous, homosexual sex in public restrooms, explosive at the time, very likely 
influencing reactions to the research design, the findings, and the researcher. 
The realities of institutional power—including the governments and boards that 
regulate researchers—may suggest one of the reasons the troika is continually 
invoked: parroting received wisdom, their repetitions enable a convenient policy 
myth, blocking further inquiry into ethical issues that ill fit the current framework. 
Regulators do not want to start over—even if regulatory designs exist that would 
better serve all concerned (e.g., FEELEY, 2007). One result is both over- and 
under-regulation: boards dither over superficialities (TILLEY, POWICK-KUMAR & 
RATKOVIĆ, 2009) while missing significant ethical issues faced by field 
researchers studying the (ab)uses of power, covertly. [89]
In our view, the control and power differences between experimenters and field 
researchers are what eliminate MILGRAM and ZIMBARDO as rationales for 
regulating field research. HUMPHREYS, whose field research actually harmed no 
one and improved the lives of many, exemplifies the opposite of what he is used 
to support. But there is more to it than that. Whereas ethics regulations focus on 
harms to individuals brought by medical experimentation, leading to the question 
of whether scientists have a "right" to do research, a more collective approach 
might be taken. We might ask instead: Do scholars have an obligation to do 
research—contributing to society in exchange for being the beneficiaries of public 
and civic funds, whether through subsidized education, grants or the privileges of 
higher education? In that case, we—especially in the sciences—have an ethical 
obligation to do research that matters, including, for the social sciences, research 
that tackles institutions that are harming society in one way or another. Such 
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research can justify deception and/or covertness if understanding of those 
concepts is revised to sort actual from imagined or speculative harms. [90]
Thinking about the ethics of covert and deceptive social science field research 
will have to transcend deception/covertness' use in psychology, the legacy of the 
experimental paradigm, and superficial treatments of the MILGRAM-ZIMBARDO-
HUMPHREYS troika. It must include differentiating between the power and 
control circumstances of experimentalists such as MILGRAM and ZIMBARDO 
and those of field researchers such as HUMPHREYS, leading to a more nuanced 
engagement with deceptive and covert research in politically fraught settings, 
such as SCHEPER-HUGHES' (2004) study of organ-trafficking. Indeed, 
covertness/deception may be called for when societal benefit outweighs the 
black-and-whiteness of "Thou shalt not bear false witness." As LEO (1995, p.121) 
put it, "In some environments, strategies based on impression management and 
deception may be necessary in order to obtain hidden and dirty data"; moreover, 
"the standards necessary to carry out the role of a morally competent field 
researcher of deviant subjects are necessarily different than the standards by 
which we judge morally competent human beings." Even ERIKSON (1967, 
pp.372-373) remarked on the absurdity of insisting "that sociologists should 
always introduce themselves as investigators everywhere they go and should 
inform every person who figures in their thinking exactly what their research is all 
about." [91]
Other ethical questions will also need to be explored, including: Who needs 
protection from whom? Do citizens only need protection from researchers? Might 
they also benefit from research that critically investigates governments, 
corporations, and other powerful entities? Who should decide these ethical 
issues, and on what grounds? Are we to continue to treat deception and 
covertness in terms of "universal" ethical principles deriving from one discipline, 
one research design, and perhaps one cultural system, or shall we look to more 
nuanced, context-specific understandings of these concepts? Clearly, we think 
the latter. [92]
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